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Preface 
 
 
From 30 to 31 October 2015, 109 academics and experts from 35 countries representing 79 
institutions took part in the Symposium of the Anti-Corruption Academic (ACAD) Initiative, organized 
jointly by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Moscow State Institute of 
International Relations (MGIMO), and the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Centre (ROLAC), Doha, 
Qatar. During the Symposium, MGIMO announced the establishment of the MGIMO Academic and 
Research Anti-corruption Center. 
 
The ACAD initiative is a collaborative academic project which seeks to support academics to teach 
and conduct research on corruption related issues. The initiative has developed a menu of academic 
resources, teaching modules, syllabi, case studies, educational tools and reference materials that can 
be used by universities and other academic institutions to develop or enhance their academic 
programmes. More information can be found here: 
http://www.track.unodc.org/Education/Pages/ACAD.aspx 
 
 
The participants of the Symposium of the ACAD initiative: 
 
 
Highlighting the importance of anti-corruption, ethics and integrity training for all students, public 
officials and professionals, as recognized in article 13 of the UN Convention against Corruption; 
 
Convinced of the important role of academia and education as an effective way to build integrity and 
to prevent and combat corruption using multidisciplinary and action learning approaches; 
 
1.   Recommend that UNODC and academic institutions, as a part of the Anti-Corruption Academic 
Initiative, and in cooperation with relevant partners, continue to develop and share academic 
materials in the field of anti-corruption related education for universities and other academic 
institutions; 
2.   Recommend that academic institutions develop and teach anti-corruption courses and 
programmes for a wide range of disciplines and students and to integrate anti-corruption 
elements into other academic courses; 
 
3.   Encourage competent educational authorities to facilitate accreditation of anti-corruption 
courses; 
4.   Recommend that relevant national, regional, international and civil society organizations work 
with academia to support the teaching of anti-corruption and the dissemination and promotion 
of academic materials to the fullest extent possible; 
 
i
5.   Recommend that ACAD members support and promote ethics and integrity learning in 
secondary and primary schools; 
6.       Recommend  that  ACAD  members  share  experiences  and  expertise  on  anti-corruption 
education through academic exchanges, workshops and networks, at the regional level and/or 
on different thematic areas; 
7.   Recommend that the ACAD members continue updating and improving the resources 
available on the ACAD homepage, including the UNCAC Model Course and materials in 
different languages; 
8.   Recommend that ACAD members and relevant national, regional, international and civil 
 
society organizations promote in-depth research of the scope, causes and risks associated 
with corruption, and the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures; 
9.   Recommend that UNODC and other relevant stakeholders continue developing capacity- 
building initiatives, including new knowledge products and technical tools, subject to the 
availability of resources, to identify comparative good practices in the field of anti-corruption 
education and to facilitate the exchange of expertise and lessons learned among academics, 
universities and other academic institutions and stakeholders in the context of the ACAD 
initiative. 
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SPORTS CORRUPTION: JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
THROUGH THE USE OF THE UNCAC AND THE UNTOC 
 
 
By Nikos Passas 
 
By Catherine Ordway 
 
The corruption scandal currently engulfing football’s international governing body, t he 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), and the recent allegations of 
bribery in order to host the 2006 World Cup in Germany
1 
raise a number of issues. 
Allegations in recent years of bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation, money- 
laundering, vote rigging and other abuses of power within several international sports 
federations demand that this type of misconduct be investigated and prosecuted. In the 
absence of a comparable international integrity oversight body similar to the World Anti- 
Doping Agency (WADA), it is timely to examine the applicability and potential 
usefulness of existing international instruments.
2
 
 
Given that the United Nations Conventions against Corruption (UNCAC) and against 
Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) represent the most comprehensive global 
standards and have the highest number of States Parties (177 and 185 respectively, as of 
October 2015), this paper examines in detail the applicability of these instruments to the 
most prominent and challenging sports corruption instances revealed in recent times. The 
misconduct covered by these instruments and their mutual legal assistance frameworks, 
in addition to innovative provisions on dual criminality, asset recovery and the definition 
of an organized criminal group, can significantly enhance international cooperation and 
effective law enforcement. In this way, justice, accountability and greater transparency 
will be boosted on a global scale. 
 
 
1 Spiegel Online, “World Cup Scandal: Germany Appears to Have Bought Right to Host 2006 Tournament”, 16 October 2015, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/documents-indicate-slush-fund-used-in-german-world-cup-bid-a-1058212.html [last 
accessed 19 October 2015]. 
 
1 Noting that the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is also supported by the UNESCO International Convention Against Doping in 
Sport (2005), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/anti-doping/international-convention-against-doping- 
in-sport/ [last accessed 19 October 2015]. 
 
*Dr., Professor and Co-Director of Institute for Security and Public Policy, Northeastern University 
**Professor of Practice, La Trobe University
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The application of United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
 
Crime (UNTOC) 
 
 
 
The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) was 
adopted in November 2000 and came into force in 2003.  As of October 2015, 185 states 
have ratified it and are parties to it.  It constitutes an acknowledgement that cross-border 
misconduct requires close international cooperation to tackle it.   States parties are 
mandated to introduce, if they do not already have, four basic criminal offences
3
.  The 
UNTOC provides an extensive facilitative legal basis and framework for extradition, 
mutual legal assistance, international cooperation in law enforcement and capacity 
building through information exchanges, training and technical assistance.   The four 
basic UNTOC offences are: 
 
    participation in an organized criminal group (Art. 5) 
 
    laundering of proceeds of crime (Art. 6) 
 
    corruption (Art. 8) 
 
    obstruction of justice (Art. 23) 
 
States parties must criminalize all of these acts.   It must be emphasized that trans- 
nationality and involvement in an organized criminal group need not and should not be 
elements of these offences in domestic law (Art. 34 (2)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Art. 5. Criminalization of participation in an organized criminal group 
1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when 
committed intentionally: (a) Either or both  of the following as criminal offences distinct  from those involving the attempt  or 
completion of the criminal activity: (i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious crime for a purpose relating 
directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit and, where required by domestic law, involving an act 
undertaken by one of the participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving an organized criminal group; (ii) Conduct by a 
person who, with knowledge of either the aim and general criminal activity of an organized criminal group or its intention to commit 
the crimes in question, takes an active part in: a. Criminal activities of the organized criminal group; 
b. Other activities of the organized criminal group in the knowledge that his or her participation will contribute to the achievement of 
the above described criminal aim; (b) Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counseling the commission of serious 
crime involving an organized criminal group. 
2. The knowledge, intent, aim, purpose or agreement referred to in paragraph 1 of this article may be inferred from objective factual 
circumstances. 
3. States Parties whose domestic law requires involvement of an organized criminal group for purposes of the offences established in 
accordance with paragraph 1 (a) (i) of this article shall ensure that their domestic law covers all serious crimes involving organized 
criminal groups. Such States Parties, as well as States Parties whose domestic law requires an act in furtherance of the agreement for 
purposes of the offences established in accordance with paragraph 1 (a) (i) of this article, shall so inform the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations at the time of their signature or of deposit of their instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to 
this Convention.
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The term “organized criminal group” is defined as a structured group of three or 
more persons that exists for a period of time, acts in concert and aims to commit serious 
crimes (i.e. crimes punishable by deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more 
serious penalty – Art. 2(b)) or other offences covered by UNTOC, in order to obtain a 
direct or indirect financial or other material benefit (Art. 2)
4
.  A structured group does not 
require a formal organization, membership or structure, but it has to be more than just: 
“…randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence” (Art. 2(c)). 
 
 
Participation in an organized criminal group is essentially agreeing to commit a 
serious crime for financial or material benefit or knowingly taking part in criminal or 
related activities of an organized criminal group to contribute to a given criminal aim. 
States Parties can adopt different approaches to conspiracy or association, but the 
important  point  is  that  domestic  law  is  expected  to  ensure  that  all  serious  crimes 
committed by organized criminal groups are covered.
5
 
 
 
 
In this context, it is interesting to consider the criminal prosecutions initiated by 
both the United States and Switzerland against high ranking members of the international 
football association.  FIFA, based in Zurich, Switzerland, owns the rights to the men’s 
and women’s World Cups and is the custodian of what is known as ‘the world game’. On 
27 May 2015, the US Department of Justice announced that it had indicted nine FIFA 
officials and five sports marketing executives for criminal enrichment, conspiracy and 
corruption through racketeering, bribery, wire fraud and money laundering.
6    
The 47- 
count indictment alleges that the co-conspirators systematically paid, and agreed to pay, 
well  over  US$150  million  in  bribes  and  kickbacks  to  obtain  lucrative  media  and 
marketing rights to international football tournaments over a 24-year period. The highest 
ranking FIFA official named is the previous President of the football association for the 
 
 
 
 
4 Ideologically motivated offences are thus not covered. 
5 One non sport benefit of this clause is that it addresses inchoate offences, such as those relating to piracy, which is not otherwise 
covered by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
6 US Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice, Press Release, “Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for 
Racketeering, Conspiracy and Corruption”, 27 May 2015,  http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate- 
executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and, [last accessed 3 October 2015].  Note that some jurisdictions, such as Russia which 
was awarded the rights to host the 2018 FIFA men’s World Cup, have criticised the actions taken by the US: S Rainsford, “Russia 
cries foul: Fifa arrests 'a conspiracy' says Moscow”, BBC News, 28 May 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32925637 
[last accessed 18 October 2015]
[last accessed 3 October 2015]. 
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Americas  (CONCACAF), and  President  of  the  Caribbean  Football  Federation,  Jack 
 
Warner. 
 
 
 
It is clear that the fourteen-man conspiracy alleged by the US can be considered to 
be an organized criminal group for these purposes, even though many of those involved 
are not US citizens.
7   
On 25 September 2015, the Swiss Office of the Attorney General 
(OAG) commenced criminal proceedings against FIFA President Joseph S. Blatter on 
‘suspicion  of   criminal   mismanagement’  and   on   ‘suspicion  of   misappropriation’ 
(Arts. 158  and  138  of  the  Swiss  Criminal  Code).    These  proceedings  relate  to  a 
broadcasting agreement between Blatter and Warner in 2005, and a 2011 payment made 
by Blatter to Michel Platini, President of the Union of European Football Associations 
(UEFA).
8   
It is not yet clear whether the purpose for making these corrupt payments was 
 
for Blatter to secure his presidential position (vote rigging), or whether it had other 
criminal motivations, such as money laundering. 
 
 
The offence of money laundering includes acts designed to obscure the criminal 
source of assets through conversion or transfers (‘layering’).   The offence covers the 
concealment of the nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of crime 
proceeds.  To the extent that this is consistent with the fundamental legal principles of 
States Parties, the offence covers also the knowing acquisition of crime proceeds as well 
as participation, association, conspiracy, attempts, aiding, abetting and facilitation of 
money laundering (Art. 6). 
 
 
The  mandatory  offence  of   corruption  covers  the  promise,  offer,   giving, 
solicitation or acceptance of any undue advantage to/by a public official in order to act or 
refrain from acting in any matter relating to the official’s public duties (Art. 8). UNTOC 
 
 
 
 
7 The jurisdictional link with the US here is the use of US bank accounts, and meetings held in the US between co-conspirators: P 
Blake, “Fifa scandal: Why the US is policing a global game”, BBC News, 28 May 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada- 
32889845 [last accessed 18 October 2015]. 
8 Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland, Press Release, “Criminal proceedings against the President of FIFA”, 25.09.2015, 
https://www.news.admin.ch/message/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=58891 [last accessed 3 October 2015].  See also the discussion by 
A Brown, “Swiss Open Criminal Proceedings Against Blatter”, Sport Integrity Initiative, 27 September 2015, 
http://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/swiss-open-criminal-proceedings-against- 
blatter/?utm_content=buffera2d6b&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
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also provides for the optional offence of bribery of foreign public officials or 
officials of international organizations – which is mandatory under the OECD convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
– and other types of corruption, such as the abuse of power, abuse of function, illicit 
enrichment, etc.
9 
(See the discussion on the UNCAC below). 
 
 
It is interesting to consider in this context whether the definition of “officials of 
international organizations” could apply to paid or unpaid representatives of bodies such 
as FIFA, WADA or the International Olympic Committee (IOC) for example. An 
obvious application of this in a sports context relates to allegations that the self-confessed 
doper and seven time Tour de France winner, Lance Armstrong, paid a bribe to the 
international cycling federation (UCI).
10  
While doping is not a criminal offence in 
 
Switzerland, unlike some other jurisdictions, the claim made by fellow team members 
Floyd Landis and Tyler Hamilton, to the United States Anti-Doping Agency that 
Armstrong bragged that he had made a ‘donation’ to the UCI to make the positive drug 
test from the 2001 Tour de Swiss “go away” could theoretically fall within this Art. 8.11 
In this case however, the Cycling Independent Reform Commission examined these 
claims and ultimately found that, while Armstrong had made a US$25,000 donation to 
the UCI in 2002, and that accepting this donation may not have been a prudent course of 
action for the UCI given the allegations surrounding Armstrong at the time, there was no 
evidence of a ‘positive’ drug test from this event, and the UCI had not committed any 
offence.
12
 
 
 
 
In addition, the UNTOC can be applied to any offences that are: 
 
    transnational 
 
 
 
 
9 The last mandatory UNTOC offence is obstruction of justice: the use of force, threats or intimidation or promise, offer or giving of 
undue advantages, in order to interfere with giving of evidence or testimony or to interfere with exercise of duties of judicial or law- 
enforcement official in connection with proceedings on any UNTOC offence. 
10 Affidavit of Floyd Landis, p. 4, and Affidavit of Tyler Hamilton, pp. 13-14. See United States Anti-Doping Agency v. Lance 
Armstrong, Reasoned Decision on Disqualification and Ineligibility (10 October 2012), http://cyclinginvestigation.usada.org/ [last 
accessed 18 October 2015] 
11 Paragraph 2.4.1.1 “Disappearance of Lance Armstrong's positive test result at the 2001 Tour de Suisse”, Cycling Independent 
Reform Commission Report (2015) pp161-166, 
http://www.uci.ch/mm/Document/News/CleanSport/16/87/99/CIRCReport2015_Neutral.pdf [last accessed 18 October 2015] 
12 Cycling Independent Reform Commission Report (2015) p166 
http://www.uci.ch/mm/Document/News/CleanSport/16/87/99/CIRCReport2015_Neutral.pdf [last accessed 18 October 2015]
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    constitute serious crimes; and 
 
    are committed by an organized criminal group 
 
 
 
A crime is considered transnational when it is committed (a) “...in more than one 
State”; or (b) “...in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction 
or control takes place in another State”; (c) “in one State but involves an org anized 
criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State” or (d) “...in one 
State but has substantial effects in another State” (Art. 3(2)). 
 
 
Thus, sports crime  and  corruption can  be addressed through the UNTOC in 
multiple ways.  The most straightforward ones would be whenever offenders act as or 
participate in an organized criminal group, launder the proceeds of their crime, bribe 
public officials or obstruct justice.   These are quite likely scenarios given the social 
organization of different types of sports misconduct as outlined above.   Unless profits 
from  these  offences  are  recycled  into  criminal  enterprises  or  informal  economies, 
proceeds of crime would have to be laundered before they can be enjoyed in open and 
legitimate transactions. Public officials in different positions may play a role in receiving 
or giving bribes, turning a blind eye or facilitating the commission of sports crimes, 
tampering with evidence, obstructing justice, assisting in the disposal of assets, money 
laundering or resisting investigation of alleged offences. 
 
 
Examples of such misconduct in the sport setting include allegations that national 
or state government officials bribed members of international sports organizations to 
obtain the right to host major events in their cities.   The scandal relating to the IOC 
awarding the rights to host the 2002 Olympic Winter Games to Salt Lake City rocked the 
Olympic movement.  In exchange for their votes, IOC members were found to have been 
variously  bribed  through  the  provision  of  medical  care  for  relatives,  workplace 
internships or scholarships at major universities for their children, expensive guns and 
majorly reduced land deals.
13
 
 
 
 
 
13 B Mallon, “The Olympic Bribery Scandal”, Journal Of Olympic History, May 2000, 
http://library.la84.org/SportsLibrary/JOH/JOHv8n2/johv8n2f.pdf [last accessed 16 October 2015]
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The UNTOC can also apply to  any ‘serious crime’ that is transnational and 
committed by an organized criminal group.   This is at the discretion of States parties, 
which need to make sure that sports-related offences are criminalized and punishable by 
four years of imprisonment or more severe penalties.  This means these offences could 
equally apply to ‘cheating to win’ (for those jurisdictions which criminalize sport doping 
offences
14
), and to ‘cheating to lose’ (match-fixing offences, such as those criminalized 
 
by Australian states
15
), as well as to corruption and fraud offences.  Therefore, not only 
does the UNTOC provide for the main offences but it also affords a framework for 
dealing with the proceeds and instrumentalities of these crimes. This is a central issue for 
control, as the international community will be able to reduce or remove the incentives 
for sports-related crime when it can be established where the money or advantages go, 
who makes illicit payments, and who benefits from them. 
 
 
One case study which can be considered in this context is the public funding 
sponsorship of the US Postal Service cycling team and the admission of systemic doping 
by Lance Armstrong and the team.
16   
This involved what is being termed ‘sporting fraud’ 
over a number of years from 1998 and implicated 12 athletes and five support staff.
17
 
 
This can also be considered to be trans-national in the sense that the US Postal team 
competed internationally, and received prize money and sponsorships fraudently outside 
of the US, including using Swiss bank accounts and other devices intended to avoid 
detection. 
 
 
Whenever available, any of these options outlined above would allow States to 
establish jurisdiction and benefit from extensive possibilities with respect to extradition, 
mutual legal assistance (esp. regarding victims, witnesses, seizure and confiscation of 
proceeds and instrumentalities of the offence, evidence located in the requested State 
 
 
 
14 C McKenzie (2007) “The use of criminal justice mechanisms to combat doping in sport”, Bond University, 
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/slej/4 [last accessed 16 October 2015] 
15 The majority of States and Territories in Australia have enacted legislation to create a crime a match-fixing, attracting a maximum 
penalty of 10 years in jail, in accordance with the National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport, Australian Commonwealth Government, 
(June 2011) http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/national-policy-on-match-fixing-in-sport [last accessed 19 
October 2015] 
16 T Tygart, “Statement From USADA CEO Travis T. Tygart Regarding The U.S. Postal Service Pro Cycling Team Doping 
Conspiracy “, 10 October 2012,  http://cyclinginvestigation.usada.org/ [last accessed 18 October 2015] 
17 “Report On Proceedings Under The World Anti-Doping Code and the USADA Protocol”, USADA, 10 October 2012, 
http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/ReasonedDecision.pdf [last accessed 4 October 2015]
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party, etc.), international cooperation, the use of special investigative techniques (e.g. 
undercover and proactive investigations), and joint investigations. 
 
 
The UNTOC provisions harmonize extradition under existing treaties and other 
arrangements and make extradition available for all UNTOC offences.   States Parties 
cannot refuse extradition solely on the basis of fiscal matters.  The UNTOC also contains 
an  aut  dedere  aut  iudicare  (extradite  or  prosecute)  obligation  (Art. 16(10)).    It  is 
noteworthy that the obligation to “submit the case without undue delay to its competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution” springs from “the request of the State Party 
seeking  extradition”.     Extradition  may  be  refused  when  the  requested  State  has 
“substantial grounds for believing that the request has been made for the purpose of 
prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person’s sex, race, religion, 
nationality, ethnic origin or political opinions or that compliance with the request would 
cause prejudice to that person’s position for any one of these reasons”. 
 
 
The  UNTOC  provisions  on  mutual  legal  assistance  are  comprehensive  (see 
Art. 18) and quite useful.  States Parties must “afford one another the widest measure of 
mutual  legal  assistance  in  investigations,  prosecutions  and  judicial  proceedings  in 
relation to the offences covered” by UNTOC (Art. 18(1); emphasis added) and include 
(Art. 18 (3)): 
(a) Taking evidence or statements from persons; 
(b) Effecting service of judicial documents; 
(c) Executing searches and seizures, and asset freezing; 
(d) Examining objects and sites; 
(e) Providing information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations; 
 
(f)  Providing original or  certified  copies  of  relevant  documents and  records, 
including government, bank, financial, corporate or business records; 
(g) Identifying or tracing proceeds of crime, property, instrumentalities or other 
things for evidentiary purposes; 
(h) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons in the requesting State Party;
128
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(i) Any other type of assistance that is not contrary to the domestic law of the 
requested State Party. 
 
States Parties are able to rely on these UNTOC provisions and establish a legal 
basis for mutual legal assistance (MLA) as an alternative to other existing instruments or 
even  in  the  absence  of  any  bi-lateral  or  other  arrangements.    For  the  purposes  of 
requesting and extending MLA, it suffices that the offence is one covered by UNTOC 
(see above) or that “the requesting State Party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
[serious]  offence  …,  is  transnational  in  nature,  including  that  victims,  witnesses, 
proceeds, instrumentalities or evidence of such offences are located in the requested State 
Party and that the offence involves an organized criminal group” (Art. 18(1)). 
 
 
Most MLA requirements are operational, rather than legislative, but Parties must 
have in place the legal powers needed to produce and deliver assistance.  Under UNTOC, 
States Parties are required to designate a central authority to receive, execute or transmit 
legal  assistance  requests  and  cannot  refuse  MLA  on  the  grounds  of  bank  secrecy. 
Further, more direct liaison arrangements are allowed for other forms of cooperation. For 
example, under Art. 27, States Parties can: 
    establish and enhance channels of communication 
 
 cooperate  in  inquiries  concerning  the  identity,  whereabouts  and  activities  of 
suspects; the movement of proceeds of crime or instrumentalities 
    exchange information on: 
 
o specific means and methods used by organized criminal groups 
 
o general    trends,    analytical    techniques,    definitions,   standards   and 
methodologies 
 
 
Investigative measures are also supported by the UNTOC, including agreements 
on joint investigations (Art. 19), domestic and international/cooperative use of special 
investigative techniques  -  such as controlled deliveries, electronic or other forms of 
surveillance and undercover operations (Art. 20) – and measures to encourage those 
involved in transnational organized crime to cooperate with law enforcement authorities 
(Art.26).  In the anti-doping setting, WADA encourages signatories to the World Anti-
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Doping Code to enter into collaborative and information-sharing arrangements with law 
enforcement
18
.  WADA itself has signed a Cooperation Agreement with the International 
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)
19 
and a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the World Customs Organization (WCO).
20
 
 
 
UNTOC is replete with additional provisions regarding practical measures to 
enhance and facilitate international cooperation. For instance, provisions with application 
to piratical events include those regarding the confiscation of money, property or other 
assets deriving from UNTOC offences (Art. 12-14), as well as assistance and protection 
for witnesses and victims (Art. 24-25)
21
. 
 
 
 
In short, the UNTOC may provide a common framework for States Parties around 
the world, when they wish to investigate, prosecute and generally control sports crime 
and corruption in a collaborative manner.   On the other hand, this proposition is not 
simple in its execution due to a series of challenges in UNTOC’s effective 
implementation. 
 
 
UNTOC Implementation Challenges 
 
 
 
In terms of implementation, the UNTOC is not a simple document.  Because it is 
comprehensive and covers a lot of ground, its implementation relies not on a single 
government body, but rather multiple units and agencies, including Ministries of Justice, 
Finance, Foreign Affairs, as well as law enforcement, supervisory and other bodies.  This 
has  challenged  the  capacity  of  many  countries  that  may  have  the  political  will  to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
WADA Guidelines, “Coordinating Investigations and Sharing Anti-Doping information and Evidence”, 5 January 2011, 
https://www.wada-ama.org/en/resources/world-anti-doping-program/coordinating-investigations-and-sharing-anti-doping- 
information [last accessed 18 October 2015] 
19 
Cooperation Agreement between WADA and INTERPOL, 2 February 2009, 
http://www.interpol.int/content/download/9287/68584/version/2/file/INTERPOL_WADA.pdf [last accessed 18 October 
2015] 
20 
Memorandum of Understanding between WADA and WCO, 27 June 2011, 
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2011/june/wco-and-world-antidoping-agency-sign-groundbreaking- 
partnership.aspx [last accessed 18 October 2015] 
21 
A detailed outline of the UNTOC provisions can be found in the Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the UNTOC, 
which is available in all UN languages (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/legislative-guide.html).
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implement  but  lack  the  means.    As  a  consequence,  States  Parties  need  technical 
assistance, which may not always be available in a timely fashion.
22
 
 
 
The number and scope of different instruments that countries are called upon or 
required to  implement and comply with have generated a  ‘regulatory tsunami’.   In 
addition to UNTOC, there are thirteen universal counter-terrorism instruments, the 
UNCAC, sanctions  and  counter-proliferation of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Financial Task Force (FATF) Recommendations, just to 
mention a few.  As a result, many governments are overwhelmed and severely stretched. 
Even  at  the  level  of  reviewing requirements, progress, accomplishments and  needs, 
several countries, including those in Southeast Asia (which in the sport environment have 
also been besieged with match-fixing scandals 
23 
), have reported a need for technical 
 
assistance.  Reports to the United Nations by States suggest that most technical assistance 
is needed for training and capacity-building (25 per cent), legal assistance (20 per cent), 
strengthening of international cooperation (16 per cent) and assistance in complying with 
reporting requirements (16 per cent).
24
 
 
 
In the cheating to lose, match-fixing, setting in sport, in the absence of a sport 
convention, similar calls for support could have been answered in part through the FIFA- 
Interpol training and capacity building center recently established in Singapore.
25  
Instead 
of accepting money from implicated organizations such as FIFA however, the UNTOC 
could provide the mechanism to assist countries, such as Singapore and Malaysia, to 
implement novel witness protection solutions, such as that posed by journalist and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 See for example the technical assistance and legal assistance needs illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and 3 in UNODC, Overview of 
technical assistance needs identified by States in their responses to the questionnaires/checklist on the implementation of the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto2009; CTOC/COP/WG.2/2009/2, 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/CTOC_COP_WG_2_2009_2_E_revised_Feb_2010.pdf [last accessed 18 
October 2015] 
23 D Hill (2013), The Insider’s Guide to Match-Fixing in Football, Anne McDermid & Associates, Toronto 
24 For example, see UNODC Overview of technical assistance requests made by States through the questionnaires/checklist on the 
implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto, 
CTOC/COP/WG.2/2009/3, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/CTOC_COP_WG2_2009_3_E.pdf [last 
accessed 18 October 2015] 
25 Except this agreement has now been suspended in light of the prosecutions currently underway against FIFA Executives (referred to 
above): O Gibson, “Interpol suspends€20m FIFA partnership to fight match-fixing”, The Guardian, 12 June 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jun/12/interpol-suspends-fifa-match-fixing-partnership [last accessed 18 October 2015]
131
131
131 
 
academic, Declan Hill. In his blog post on 23 September 2015, Hill proposes that, 
instead of funding expensive conventions, such as the recent International Centre for 
Sport Security (ICSS) “Financial Integrity and Transparency in Sport Forum”26 (which 
Hill characterizes as ‘dead catting’ and ‘image laundering’ exercises 27), the Qatari-funded 
organization could instead pay to house convicted match-fixers such as Singaporean 
match-fixer and inventor of the ghost game, Pal, or Malaysian national, Dan Tan, to give 
evidence against all sports (and public) officials involved in criminal offences.
28
 
 
 
Unfortunately, thus far, the identified needs of States Parties have not always been 
at the top of priority lists both by the donor community and governments.  As has been 
pointed out, the strengthening of law enforcement and prosecutorial activities, services 
and   institutions   especially   against   serious   organized   crime   and   corruption   is 
comparatively neglected (van Dijk, 2008).  In addition to these issues, when available, 
the quality of technical assistance extended to different countries and agencies is quite 
diverse and occasionally leaves room for significant improvement. 
 
 
Coordination of work conducted even within one capital city is another difficulty. 
This is partly because of the independent actions of the numerous implementing 
government agencies requesting and receiving assistance.  Partly it is also due to the fact 
that most bi-lateral aid agencies do not work closely with those of other countries. 
 
 
Finally, the political will – a conditio sine qua non for effective implementation – 
 
is not always strong enough, because the fight against the main UNTOC offences is not 
 
 
 
 
26 ICSS, FITS Forum, Lausanne (3-4 Sept 2015), http://designsouq.com/news/read/us-experts-join-strong-international-field-for-fits- 
forum [last accessed 18 October 2015] 
27 D Hill, “Dead catting, Image Laundering and why you should have nothing to do with the ICSS”, Blog, 15 September 2015, 
http://declanhill.com/dead-catting-image-laundering-and-why-you-should-have-nothing-to-do-with-the-icss/ 
28  D Hill, “Requiem for a Fixer”, Blog, 23 September 2015, http://declanhill.com/requiem-for-a-fixer/ [last accessed 18 October 
2015]: “Take the money they spend on one of their interminable conferences where they gather a group of people to speak nonsense to 
each other.  Take the money for just one of those conferences and give it to Pal.  Let him take his family and move to Sri Lanka.  Give 
Pal enough money to be comfortable.  Here is his one condition.  He has to fly around the world and testify against all sports officials, 
players and referees that he bribed.  All the league officials.  All the FIFA-connected people.  All the team owners who used to pay 
him to organize the fixes.  All the internationally-ranked players and referees that he corrupted.  If he is caught lying – even once – in 
his testimony, he goes back to Singaporean prison, this time for twenty years. 
 
Pal’s potential testimony (like Dan Tan) would truly clean up the sport. It would strike a significant blow against the organized 
criminals inside football. However, it is a blow that the sporting establishment is desperate not to have happen.  Better for them that 
fixers like Pal and Tan are shut up where no one can hear them.  Now the sporting establishment can carry on with their nonsensical 
battle against fixing and the corrupt elements in their midst can continue to ruin the sport.”
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everywhere considered as a top priority.   For example, currently, criminalizing 
doping as defined via the Anti-Doping Rule Violations in the World Anti-Doping Code, 
is unlikely to attract significant support (except in some jurisdictions for those most 
serious or ‘aggravated’ doping offences such as seen in the Armstrong case above)29 and 
match-fixing, even where distinguished from simply sports gambling or tanking, has very 
little legislative appetite internationally.
30   
Nonetheless, provided the sports offences of 
concern are criminalized domestically with a penalty of four years or more, UNTOC may 
hold promise as a novel tool for controlling a whole range of sports misconduct primarily 
because it does not involve curtailing signatory States sovereignty (see Art. 4
31
). 
 
 
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) 
 
 
 
The UN Convention Against Corruption could be another good option, if sports 
misconduct can be connected to any of its offences. The offences covered by the 
Convention are distinguished between those that are mandatory (States parties are 
obligated to establish domestic legislation criminalizing these) and those that are non- 
mandatory (which remain at the discretion of the States parties).  Mandatory Offences 
include: 
    Active bribery of public officials (Art. 15 [a]) 
 
    Passive bribery of public officials (Art. 15 [b]) 
 
    Active bribery of foreign officials and officials of international organizations 
 
(Art. 16 [a]) 
 
    Money laundering (Art. 23) 
 
    Embezzlement, misappropriation and other diversion of public property (Art. 17) 
 
    Obstruction of justice 
 
 
 
 
29 C McKenzie (2007) “The use of criminal justice mechanisms to combat doping in sport”, Bond University, 
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/slej/4 [last accessed 16 October 2015] 
30 As set out above, Australia is an exception to this in the match-fixing setting, where a 10 year maximum jail penalty has been set in 
most States: National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport, Australian Commonwealth Government, (June 2011), 
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/national-policy-on-match-fixing-in-sport [last accessed 19 October 
2015] 
31 Art. 4. Protection of sovereignty. 
1. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality 
and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. 
2. Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in the territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and 
performance of functions that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other State by its domestic law.
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Non-Mandatory Offences are: 
 
    Passive bribery of foreign officials and officials of international organizations 
 
(Art. 16 [b]) 
 
    Illicit enrichment (Art. 20) 
 
    Abuse of function (Art. 19) 
 
    Trading in influence (Art. 18) 
 
    Private to private bribery – active and passive (Art. 21) 
 
    Embezzlement in private sector (Art. 22) 
 
The UNCAC elaborates much further the corruption-related offences which are 
also covered by UNTOC and provides for several additional offences, which have indeed 
proved very practical and popular in many countries, especially those which relate to 
illicit  enrichment.    The  offence  of  the  bribery  of  foreign  public  officials  and  that 
regarding officials of international organizations should be especially helpful in the sports 
environment.  Everything stated above with respect to the linkages of sports crimes with 
UNTOC offences applies also to UNCAC, but some further advantages of applying 
UNCAC should be underlined. 
 
As of October 2015, the UNCAC has 177 States parties and enjoys a great deal of 
momentum and genuine acceptance in the global South, thanks to its path-breaking 
chapter on asset recovery and repatriation.  The anti-corruption agenda has been linked 
for obvious reasons to that of public procurement, development, rule of law and good 
governance.  The implementation of the UNCAC thus benefits from significant activity 
and synergies with the development community, where the prevailing concerns are those 
of institutional reforms and economic growth.   The goals of the anti-corruption and 
development communities are the same or entirely consistent (Passas, 2014), and as a 
result many more resources are devoted to UNCAC-related reforms than for other 
international legal instruments. 
 
Another substantive advantage of the application of UNCAC is the advanced 
mutual legal assistance (MLA) and international cooperation framework it provides for 
willing States parties, which can make processes and exchanges even easier in practice. 
For example, dual criminality (which is required by UNTOC) is relaxed by allowing the
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existence of different legal definitions, provided that the basic acts are the same in the 
jurisdictions concerned.   Also States Parties are required to provide MLA even in the 
absence of dual criminality, if they are asked to apply non-coercive measures. Parties are 
also allowed to collaborate on their own initiative, even if there is no dual criminality and 
encouraged to exchange information informally and even without a previous request from 
another State party
32
. 
 
 
However the challenges to the implementation of UNCAC are substantial.   In 
addition to those challenges listed with respect to the implementation of the UNTOC, 
which are even more applicable to the broader and more comprehensive UNCAC.  Its 
chapter on prevention chapter (Chapter II, Art. 5-14), which constitutes a blueprint for 
good governance in general, contains so many measures, policies and practices that the 
full and effective implementation of the UNCAC for most countries is a long-term 
project. By a long list of metrics (WBI, Global Integrity, TI CPI, etc.), despite substantial 
investment in resources, technical assistance and capacity building, the world can and 
should do a much better job at improving its response against corruption and lack of 
integrity in business, sport and government. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The main point of this paper is that the contemporary manifestations of sports crime and 
corruption are not adequately addressed by laws and frameworks developed with these 
offences in mind.  Alternative approaches ought to be considered, including the resort to 
comprehensive, global instruments enjoying global consensus support, which can enable 
extensive international cooperation and practical solutions, as a range of crimes can be 
defined as convention offences or offences that can be tackled on the basis of these 
conventions.  The UNTOC and the UNCAC hold pragmatic promise despite the serious 
implementation challenges on the ground, which make progress incremental and slow. 
One essential vital condition is that we develop genuine political will to activate the use 
of these Conventions for sports crime control. 
 
 
 
 
32   See Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the UNCAC: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/legislative-guide.html 
[last accessed 18 October 2015].
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The final points to raise here toward assisting with the planning of such creative 
applications and assisting with the good work of many donor organizations and 
government agencies are lessons drawn from international implementation practice and 
experience.   Precisely because of the significant activity necessary for some time to 
come, three main guidelines should be taken into consideration. 
 
First, countries and government bodies may express political will to implement 
these complex conventions, but the best results can  be expected  when officials  are 
convinced about the concrete benefits they will derive in terms of their own priorities and 
policy objectives. Incentives are thus of paramount importance.  When countries see for 
themselves the multiple applications and usefulness of these conventions (for example 
with  respect  to  improved  economic  growth,  foreign  investment,  rule  of  law  and  a 
criminal justice system that is better able to raise revenue and mete out justice), efforts 
will be better resourced and supported. 
 
Second, efforts must revolve around a strategy.   These projects are long term, 
while political necessities demand short-term accomplishments.   A well-constructed 
strategy would  set  long-term  objectives  and  ensure  the  smaller  scale  programs and 
projects meet their targets but are also instrumental and conducive to the attainment of 
ultimate goals.   In this way, momentum and credibility will grow, legitimacy will be 
strengthened and the process will become sustainable. 
 
Third, this strategic effort must be based on outreach and consensus that includes 
all stakeholders, including the private sector, sports governance institutions, civil society, 
academia, and quite importantly, the private sector.   Where everyone participates and 
owns the overall project, the long-term success will be based on a more solid foundation 
and will benefit all contributors. 
 
Sports crime and corruption could thus be tackled through these innovative UN 
instruments, but the best outcomes for all types of security and other serious crime threats 
will be achieved through the concerted and thoughtful efforts described above.
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